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Abstract 
Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social 
dilemma settings, but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing 
cooperation across market and nonmarket settings. This paper reports the results from 
an experiment that compares behavior in theoretically equivalent public good games 
and market games with externalities. Both positive and negative external effects are 
considered. Results indicate that people tend to be less cooperative in the marketplace 
relative to the nonmarket setting, whether the external effect is positive or negative. 
Most striking is the finding that the combination of a positive external effect in a 
nonmarket setting (i.e., the standard public good game) stands apart from the other 
market and nonmarket settings. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Collective action problems occur when there is an externality—when an agent fails to 
fully internalize the consequences of its action. Externalities exist in and out of markets, 
leading to market failures and social dilemmas. An extensive experimental literature has 
examined a wide range of market and nonmarket collective action problems using 
various experimental frameworks such as the public good game, common-pool 
resource game, oligopoly game and markets with negative externalities. A particularly 
prominent social dilemma in the literature is the public good game, in which each 
individual of a group faces a cost to generate a benefit that is shared by all, therefore 
creating a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. 
While standard models of self-interest predict people will underprovide the public good, 
results from the lab and field consistently find that people act more cooperatively and 
provide more of the public good than theory predicts (Ledyard, 1995 and Chaudhuri, 
2011). 
 
Researchers have explored how the cooperation observed in the public good game 
compares to other variants of social dilemmas. Studies show that people are less 
cooperative when the public good game is reframed as a theoretically equivalent public 
bad (Andreoni, 1995 and Sonnemans et al., 1998) and people exhibit similar behavior 
when the social dilemma is constructed as a common-pool resource game (Sell and 
Son, 1997 and Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006).1 This line of inquiry however has 
not moved beyond social dilemmas to examine how cooperation in the public good 
game compares to an equivalent market failure. Given collective action problems occur 
in both market and nonmarket settings, it is important to both researchers and 
policymakers to understand the behavioral implications of this distinction. The best way 
to investigate or mitigate a collective action problem might depend on whether the 
activity that generates the externality occurs in or out of the marketplace. Previous work 
that uses experimental markets with negative externalities indicate the distinction 
matters, reporting very little cooperative behavior in the absence of corrective 
mechanisms (Plott, 1983). However, without a clean comparison, it is not clear whether 
this casual observation is due to the negative frame or the market institution or the 
interaction between them. 
 
This paper provides a clean comparison of cooperative behavior in and out of markets 
by comparing four theoretically equivalent collective action problems that vary in two 
dimensions: (a) public good dilemma vs. market with an externality and (b) positive 
externality vs. negative externality. Thus, we isolate the influence of the institutional 
frame and the positive/negative frame, as well as potentially important interaction 
effects. Consistent with previous research, we find that the positive/negative frame 
matters in both the public good and market settings, but we also find the institutional 
frame affects cooperation. In particular, we provide support for the conjecture that a 
marketplace generates more selfishness. Most compelling, however, is the importance 
of the interaction of the positive/negative and institutional frames. In particular, the 
combination of a positive externality and a collective institution (i.e., the standard public 
good game) generates unique levels of cooperative behavior. 
2 Experimental Design 
 
We employ a 2×2 design, with treatment variables externality   and institution. The 
externality can be positive   or negative, in the sense that an action explicitly increases 
or decreases the payoffs of others. The institution is either a nonmarket public good 
game, in which members of a group make contributions to a public account that 
generates positive or negative returns to everybody, or a market game, in which buyers 
purchase a good from an automated seller in a simple posted offer market that provides 
value to them but also generates additional benefits or costs to other market 
participants. In each treatment, the payoff for the ith subject that contributes/purchases 
xi units is: 
 
 
 
where ei is the initial endowment, a is the opportunity cost of each 
contribution/purchase, bb is subject i’s individual return from each of her 
contributions/purchases, and cc is the benefit/cost received from each of the 
contributions/purchases made by the other k subjects. 
 
In the positive-externality public good game  , each member of a group of four (k=4k=4) 
is endowed with 10 tokens (ei=10ei=10). She must decide how many of her tokens to 
contribute to the public account (xixi). For each token contributed, the member foregoes 
one token (a=1a=1) from her private account in exchange for an individual return of 0.4 
tokens from the public account while providing a benefit of 0.4 tokens to the other group 
members ( b=0.4;c=0.4). Similarly, in the positive-externality market 
game  , each buyer in the market is endowed with 10 tokens (ei=10ei=10) and must 
decide how many units (0–10) of a good to buy (xixi). For each purchase, the buyer 
pays a price of one token (a=1a=1) from her private account and receives a personal 
benefit of 0.4 tokens while also providing a benefit of 0.4 tokens to each of the other 
buyers in the market ( b=0.4;c=0.4). In both positive-externality treatments, 
since b<ab<a each subject contributes zero tokens to the public account in a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium and earns 10 tokens. 
 
In the negative-externality public good game  , each member of the group is endowed 
with 16 tokens (ei=16ei=16). She must decide how many of her tokens to contribute to 
the public account (xixi). For each token contributed, the member foregoes one token 
(a=1a=1) from her private account in exchange for an individual return of 1.6 tokens 
from the public account while imposing a cost of 0.4 tokens to the other group members 
(b=1.6b=1.6; c=−0.4c=−0.4). Similarly, in the negative-externality market game  , each 
buyer in the market is endowed with 16 tokens (ei=16ei=16) and must decide how many 
units (0–10) of a good to buy (xixi). For each purchase, the buyer pays a price of one 
token (a=1a=1) from her private account and receives a personal benefit of 1.6 tokens 
while also imposing a cost of 0.4 tokens to each of the other buyers in the market (
b=1.6;c=−0.4). In both negative-externality treatments, since b>ab>a 
each player will contribute/purchase 10 units and earn 10 tokens in a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
Two items are worth noting. First, the four games are theoretically equivalent in the 
sense that pecuniary self-interested players are expected to earn identical payoffs in 
equilibrium, and symmetric off-equilibrium behavior yields identical payoffs as well. 
Second, the four games are operationally identical with differences arising in the 
framing of roles (member vs. buyer), setting (group vs. market), and actions 
(contributing vs. purchasing). 
 
The experiments were conducted at Appalachian State University using software 
specifically designed for this research. For each treatment, players were placed in 
groups of four that were randomly reshuffled at the beginning of each of 20 periods. For 
each treatment we have 400 individual observations and 100 group-level observations. 
One token converted to 0.50 USD and subjects were paid earnings from two randomly 
chosen periods. Average earnings were $16. 
 
3 Results 
 
Cooperative behavior is defined as the number of tokens allocated to the cooperative 
outcome—either through purchases in the market setting or voluntary contributions in 
the public good setting. Fig. 1 illustrates the mean cooperative behavior over time for all 
four treatments. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Average cooperative behavior by treatment over periods. 
 
The data indicate the type of externality (positive vs. negative) significantly influences 
the level of cooperative behavior in both the public good and market game. Comparing 
the positive and negative externality in the public good game, cooperative behavior is 
significantly greater in the positive case—41.0 vs. 13.1% (p=0.000p=0.000).3 This 
corresponds with previous findings (Andreoni, 1995). We find a much smaller, but still 
significant, effect in the market game with mean cooperation levels being 14.0% in the 
positive-externality case and 7.0% in the negative-externality case (p=0.000p=0.000). 
 
Results indicate that the institution also influences cooperative behavior. When the 
externality is positive, we observe a striking difference in cooperation across the public 
good and market settings. Specifically, the mean cooperation level is 41.0% in the 
positive-externality public good game while only being 14.0% in the positive-externality 
market game (p=0.000p=0.000). A similar result emerges when the externality is 
negative. Mean cooperation is higher in the negative-externality public good game than 
the negative-externality market game—13.1 vs. 7.0% (p=0.000p=0.000). 
 
The most striking result is the extent that the positive-externality public good treatment 
stands apart from the other three treatments. Noting that cooperative behavior in this 
standard public good treatment is very much in line with the large public good literature 
(see Chaudhuri, 2011), we find this combination of a positive externality and a 
nonmarket public good setting creates a unique setting for cooperative behavior. This 
finding is particularly evident in the final periods, when the positive-externality public-
good treatment is significantly different from the other three statistically equivalent 
treatments. 
 
We confirm our unconditional results with a regression analysis that takes advantage of 
the panel nature of our data. We estimate the treatment effects on the level of 
cooperative behavior (in tokens) with a linear panel model that controls for period-
specific fixed-effects and yields robust standard errors with clustering at the individual 
level. Table 1 reports the results from three models. Model 1 provides the estimates 
from the pooled data (all 20 periods), and Models 2 and 3 give estimates from data 
stratified by the first and last 10 periods. 
 
Table 1 Linear regression models on cooperative behavior by treatment 
 
The conditional analysis confirms our initial impressions and highlights three key 
findings. First, estimates show that the type of externality (positive vs. negative) matters 
in both the public good and market games. Cooperation is higher in the case of a 
positive externality in the public good game (p=0.000p=0.000) and market game 
(p=0.052p=0.052). Second, results indicate the institution also affects cooperative 
behavior. Regardless of the externality frame, cooperative behavior is significantly lower 
in the market game than in the public good game (positive: p=0.000p=0.000; negative: 
p=0.016p=0.016). Third, the interaction of the externality and institution is important, 
particularly over time. Estimates from Models 2 and 3 show that, while the distinctions of 
externalities and institutions matter initially, the effects disappear over time in some 
cases. Specifically, pair-wise coefficient tests in the last 10 periods confirm that the 
market game becomes unaffected by the type of externality over time 
(p=0.244p=0.244), and the negative externality becomes unaffected by the institution 
over time (p=0.586p=0.586). The resulting outcome is that the positive-externality public 
good treatment generates much greater cooperative behavior than the other three 
treatments. Indeed, in the final 10 periods, only the standard public good treatment 
significantly differs from the other three treatments (p=0.000p=0.000). 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Experimental studies have compared cooperation across various social dilemma 
settings, but the literature is silent on comparing nonmarket social dilemmas to 
equivalent market failures. This paper offers initial insights on this issue by comparing 
cooperation levels observed in equivalent public good games and laboratory markets 
with externalities. People tend to be less cooperative in the marketplace relative to the 
nonmarket setting, though this result fades over time. Most striking is that the standard 
public good game stands apart from the other settings. Thus, while the type of 
externality and institution matters, their interaction appears to matter most. 
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